Revert "feat: keep secrets in sync via age-encrypted master key (#208) (#223)"

This reverts commit 96b1660b59.
This commit is contained in:
Thomas SharedInbox
2026-05-24 18:39:23 +02:00
parent 09c90c244b
commit b2c11e0c63
11 changed files with 29 additions and 443 deletions
+3 -63
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@@ -174,70 +174,10 @@ Run a secret manager co-located with the Dagger host. The CI job authenticates w
- Vault itself becomes a security-critical single point of failure.
- Operational overhead likely disproportionate for a small single-developer project.
### Option 5: Encrypted secrets file (age) — **implemented**
Store all production secrets in a file (`secrets.env`) that is encrypted with
[age](https://age-encryption.org/) into `secrets.age`. The encrypted file is
committed to the repository. Only the age private key — a single string — is
stored in Codeberg as `SECRETS_AGE_KEY`. Any CI job or developer with the key
can decrypt the file and obtain all secrets.
**How it works:**
1. Generate a key pair once:
```bash
age-keygen -o ~/.config/age/sharedinbox.key
age-keygen -y ~/.config/age/sharedinbox.key > .age-public-key
```
2. Copy `secrets.env.example` to `secrets.env`, fill in all values, then encrypt:
```bash
scripts/secrets-encrypt.sh # reads public key from .age-public-key
git add secrets.age && git commit -m "chore: update encrypted secrets"
```
3. Add the private key content as `SECRETS_AGE_KEY` in Codeberg repository secrets.
4. CI jobs call `scripts/secrets-decrypt.sh` (with `SECRETS_AGE_KEY` set) before
any step that needs production credentials. The script writes each variable
to `$GITHUB_ENV` so subsequent steps see them automatically.
**Keeping local and CI in sync:**
When you rotate a secret locally, update `secrets.env`, re-run
`scripts/secrets-encrypt.sh`, and commit the new `secrets.age`. CI will pick
up the fresh secrets on the next push — no manual CI variable updates needed.
Multi-line values (SSH keys, certificates) must be stored as a single line
with `\n` escape sequences inside double quotes. Example:
```
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY="<header>\n<base64 key body>\n<footer>"
```
**Pro:**
- One secret (`SECRETS_AGE_KEY`) in Codeberg instead of many.
- Encrypted secrets are version-controlled — rotating a secret is a git commit.
- Local dev environment and CI always use the same encrypted source of truth.
- `age` is a simple, audited tool with no server infrastructure.
- The private key never appears in workflow files or logs.
**Con:**
- `secrets.age` exposes the list of variable *names* (visible in the encrypted
file if the format leaks, though not the values).
- All credentials share a single key — compromising `SECRETS_AGE_KEY` exposes
everything at once.
- Key rotation requires re-encrypting `secrets.age` and updating the CI secret.
### Recommendation
**Option 5** (encrypted secrets file) is now the active approach. It reduces
Codeberg secrets to exactly two categories:
- **Dagger access credentials** — `DAGGER_STUNNEL_URL`, `DAGGER_CA_CERT`,
`DAGGER_CLIENT_CERT`, `DAGGER_CLIENT_KEY`.
- **Master key** — `SECRETS_AGE_KEY`.
**Option 1** (runner-level env vars) or **Option 2** (secret files) are the pragmatic starting point for a single self-hosted runner. They require no new infrastructure and move all production secrets off Codeberg immediately.
**Option 1** (runner-level env vars) or **Option 2** (secret files) remain
valid if you prefer not to commit an encrypted file to the repository.
**Option 3** (Dagger host as orchestrator) is worth considering once the trigger SSH key replaces all other secrets in Codeberg — it offers the cleanest security boundary at the cost of reduced CI observability.
**Option 3** (Dagger host as orchestrator) is worth considering once the
trigger SSH key replaces all other secrets in Codeberg — it offers the cleanest
security boundary at the cost of reduced CI observability.
**Option 4** (Vault) becomes worthwhile if the project grows to multiple
runners or team members who each need audited access to deploy credentials.
**Option 4** (Vault) becomes worthwhile if the project grows to multiple runners or team members who each need audited access to deploy credentials.